Important news from Tamika

RSS

She came, she saw, she confounded: Clinton in Pakistan


Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recently concluded visit to Pakistan has left us none the wiser about how the United States and its allies will end the  Afghan war. In her public comments, she spoke of action ”over the next days and weeks – not months and years, but days and weeks”.  She promised the United States would tackle Taliban militants in eastern Afghanistan in response to a long-standing Pakistani complaint that Washington had neglected the region when  it decided to concentrate its forces in population centres in southern Afghanistan in 2010 (remember “government in a box”?). She called, in return, for cooperation on the Pakistani side of the border to ”squeeze these terrorists so that they cannot attack and kill any Pakistani, any Afghan, any American, or anyone.”  Between the two countries, they would tackle the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban. But squeeze them to what end?  To weaken all but the hard-core leadership of the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network so that they agree to lay down arms and rejoin the political process in Afghanistan? Or to entice them into serious negotiations through which they might be offered a share of power in Kabul, or accommodated in a “soft partition” of Afghanistan (an idea deeply unpopular among Afghans) which leaves them in control of the south and the east? As Pakistani columnist Ejaz Haider wrote in Pakistan Today just before Clinton arrived, the current U.S. policy looks a bit like the dialogue between Alice and the Cheshire Cat. “‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?’ asked Alice. ‘That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,’ said the Cat. ‘I don’t much care where—’ said Alice. ‘Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,’ said the Cat.” True, Clinton stressed the need for a peace process to reach a political settlement in Afghanistan.  But that idea has been on the diplomatic agenda  for nearly two years. By the second half of last year, we were hearing that the United States had endorsed talkswith all of Afghanistan’s main insurgent groups, including the Haqqani network. By January this year, western countries said there would be no preconditions set for insurgents entering peace talks – only end-conditions that they sever ties with al Qaeda, renounce violence and agree to respect the Afghan constitution. In February, Clinton stressed the need for negotiations in a landmark speech to the Asia Society which coincided with reports the United States had begun direct talks with the Taliban. In other words, we have heard a lot about talk about talks without any explanation as to why these have achieved so little so far (some blame U.S. military strategy, others Pakistani interference, others Taliban intransigence, others poor Afghan governance).   And the danger is that as long as these talks about talks continue without  yielding results, all parties to the Afghan conflict arm themselves up in readiness for an escalating civil war. True,  Clinton admitted in public during her visit to Islamabad that the United States had held a preliminary meeting with representatives of the Haqqani network. But we already knew that.    According to The Washington Post, U.S. officials met Ibrahim Haqqani, the brother of the group’s patriarch, Jalaluddin Haqqani, in a Gulf kingdom in August. The meeting was arranged by the head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who also attended, it reported. But that meeting does not seem to have gone well. It was followed by an attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul which the United States blamed on the Haqqani network and which prompted outgoing chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen to describe the group as a “veritable arm” of the ISI. Clinton has made clear the U.S. strategy will continue. ” We’re going to be fighting, we’re going to be talking and we’re going to be building,” she told reporters in Afghanistan.  And even if that carries a ring of ”if at first you don’t succeed, try, try and try again”, that is no reason to dismiss it out of hand. However much the United States and its allies are looking for a way out of the Afghan war, pressure is also mounting on Pakistan. Washington is stepping up efforts to bring supplies to Afghanistan through Central Asia – Clinton flew from Pakistan to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – thereby reducing U.S. dependence on Islamabad/Rawalpindi even as Pakistan’s own deteriorating economic health is making it harder for it to risk losing international and U.S. financial support. And more importantly India this month signed a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan – one unlikely to have been reached without U.S. approval — which gives India the capability, if not the intention, to put Pakistan under pressure on both its western and eastern borders. Yet even as the United States doubles down, do also consider two quite different approaches, both of which have the merit of greater clarity but which are also  diametrically opposed. One of them I heard presented this month by Amrullah Saleh, the Tajik former head of the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) and a fierce critic of talks with the Taliban. At a conference organised by the Asia-Pacific Foundation in London,  he argued there was no reason to believe Pakistan would be any more inclined to cooperate with the United States now than it was when Washington sent in more troops to Afghanistan. “With that escalation, Pakistan did not cooperate. Why would Pakistan cooperate with de-escalation?” he said. Rather than rely on Pakistan, he argued that the Afghan government must implement reforms to restore the trust of the Afghan people so they would at least have a state by 2014, when U.S.-led troops are meant to hand over responsibility for security to Afghan forces. And Kabul should change its policy of talks with the Taliban which had “blurred the narrative” for Afghans about who they were fighting, looking instead at reintegrating all but the 200 or so in the inner circle of the insurgency’s leadership.. But a scenario which led to a ceasefire and a political deal which left Pakistan and what he called its proxies with control over eastern and southern Afghanistan would offer only “a temporary, deceptive, stability”.  The Taliban would remain militant in order to put pressure on Kabul and extort further concessions from the west. Such a deal might provide cover for a withdrawal of western troops, but would also lead to ”massive civil strife”. The opposite approach is the one advocated by Pakistan, which  – in somewhat unfortunately chosen words - is to “give peace a chance”.  Articulated in detail in a report produced jointly by the Jinnah Institute and the United States Institute of Peace, it aims for a negotiated settlement giving Afghan Pashtun a bigger say in the political process and possibly including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network. According to this version, the U.S. position of fight, talk and build cannot work because the insurgents will not trust the Americans to negotiate sincerely as long as they reserve the right to use their very considerable force.  Only a ceasefire on all sides would pave the way for meaningful talks on a political settlement. The report, criticised to some extent within Pakistan, also notes what is perhaps one of the trickiest issues in the whole approach to Taliban talks: this is not just about Afghanistan. Whatever Pakistan really wants to happen in Afghanistan, and whatever it support it does or does not give to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, it is also dependent on them to keep control of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). According to this excerpt, those who contributed to the Jinnah Institute report questioned “the mis-perception that the Pakistani security establishment is unaware of the growing linkages between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani militant groups.” “ However, they argue that while the current links remain limited, it is precisely the fear of these growing into full blown operational cooperation and coordination that prevents the Pakistani state from targeting Afghan insurgent groups on its soil. Moreover, the security establishment is able to take advantage of the present linkages between these groups from time to time by persuading the Afghan Taliban to pressure the TTP and other North Waziristan-based militants to curtail their activities.” Stretch that argument out further and you could make a case that Pakistan needs to get a reasonable deal for the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqanis in Afghanistan if it wants them, in return, to bring the Pakistani Taliban to heel. So to get back to Clinton and the Afghan settlement. We have three possible approaches, with various permutations.  The one currently favoured by the United States is to keep fighting, to keep the door open for talks, and to keep piling pressure on Pakistan in the hope that it yields results. The second – as expressed by Amrullah Saleh – is to take the idea of talks with insurgent leaders off the table altogether, end the confusion and build up governance within Afghanistan in the years that are left before 2014. The third is to seek a ceasefire, so that in the absence of violence, talks might take place in a more conducive atmosphere. Any one of those approaches has its merits.  But as long as all these conflicting ideas remain out there, we will see a lot of different groups lining up to argue with the Cheshire Cat.

She came, she saw, she confounded: Clinton in Pakistan


Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recently concluded visit to Pakistan has left us none the wiser about how the United States and its allies will end the  Afghan war. In her public comments, she spoke of action ”over the next days and weeks – not months and years, but days and weeks”.  She promised the United States would tackle Taliban militants in eastern Afghanistan in response to a long-standing Pakistani complaint that Washington had neglected the region when  it decided to concentrate its forces in population centres in southern Afghanistan in 2010 (remember “government in a box”?). She called, in return, for cooperation on the Pakistani side of the border to ”squeeze these terrorists so that they cannot attack and kill any Pakistani, any Afghan, any American, or anyone.”  Between the two countries, they would tackle the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban. But squeeze them to what end?  To weaken all but the hard-core leadership of the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network so that they agree to lay down arms and rejoin the political process in Afghanistan? Or to entice them into serious negotiations through which they might be offered a share of power in Kabul, or accommodated in a “soft partition” of Afghanistan (an idea deeply unpopular among Afghans) which leaves them in control of the south and the east? As Pakistani columnist Ejaz Haider wrote in Pakistan Today just before Clinton arrived, the current U.S. policy looks a bit like the dialogue between Alice and the Cheshire Cat. “‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?’ asked Alice. ‘That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,’ said the Cat. ‘I don’t much care where—’ said Alice. ‘Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,’ said the Cat.” True, Clinton stressed the need for a peace process to reach a political settlement in Afghanistan.  But that idea has been on the diplomatic agenda  for nearly two years. By the second half of last year, we were hearing that the United States had endorsed talkswith all of Afghanistan’s main insurgent groups, including the Haqqani network. By January this year, western countries said there would be no preconditions set for insurgents entering peace talks – only end-conditions that they sever ties with al Qaeda, renounce violence and agree to respect the Afghan constitution. In February, Clinton stressed the need for negotiations in a landmark speech to the Asia Society which coincided with reports the United States had begun direct talks with the Taliban. In other words, we have heard a lot about talk about talks without any explanation as to why these have achieved so little so far (some blame U.S. military strategy, others Pakistani interference, others Taliban intransigence, others poor Afghan governance).   And the danger is that as long as these talks about talks continue without  yielding results, all parties to the Afghan conflict arm themselves up in readiness for an escalating civil war. True,  Clinton admitted in public during her visit to Islamabad that the United States had held a preliminary meeting with representatives of the Haqqani network. But we already knew that.    According to The Washington Post, U.S. officials met Ibrahim Haqqani, the brother of the group’s patriarch, Jalaluddin Haqqani, in a Gulf kingdom in August. The meeting was arranged by the head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who also attended, it reported. But that meeting does not seem to have gone well. It was followed by an attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul which the United States blamed on the Haqqani network and which prompted outgoing chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen to describe the group as a “veritable arm” of the ISI. Clinton has made clear the U.S. strategy will continue. ” We’re going to be fighting, we’re going to be talking and we’re going to be building,” she told reporters in Afghanistan.  And even if that carries a ring of ”if at first you don’t succeed, try, try and try again”, that is no reason to dismiss it out of hand. However much the United States and its allies are looking for a way out of the Afghan war, pressure is also mounting on Pakistan. Washington is stepping up efforts to bring supplies to Afghanistan through Central Asia – Clinton flew from Pakistan to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – thereby reducing U.S. dependence on Islamabad/Rawalpindi even as Pakistan’s own deteriorating economic health is making it harder for it to risk losing international and U.S. financial support. And more importantly India this month signed a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan – one unlikely to have been reached without U.S. approval — which gives India the capability, if not the intention, to put Pakistan under pressure on both its western and eastern borders. Yet even as the United States doubles down, do also consider two quite different approaches, both of which have the merit of greater clarity but which are also  diametrically opposed. One of them I heard presented this month by Amrullah Saleh, the Tajik former head of the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) and a fierce critic of talks with the Taliban. At a conference organised by the Asia-Pacific Foundation in London,  he argued there was no reason to believe Pakistan would be any more inclined to cooperate with the United States now than it was when Washington sent in more troops to Afghanistan. “With that escalation, Pakistan did not cooperate. Why would Pakistan cooperate with de-escalation?” he said. Rather than rely on Pakistan, he argued that the Afghan government must implement reforms to restore the trust of the Afghan people so they would at least have a state by 2014, when U.S.-led troops are meant to hand over responsibility for security to Afghan forces. And Kabul should change its policy of talks with the Taliban which had “blurred the narrative” for Afghans about who they were fighting, looking instead at reintegrating all but the 200 or so in the inner circle of the insurgency’s leadership.. But a scenario which led to a ceasefire and a political deal which left Pakistan and what he called its proxies with control over eastern and southern Afghanistan would offer only “a temporary, deceptive, stability”.  The Taliban would remain militant in order to put pressure on Kabul and extort further concessions from the west. Such a deal might provide cover for a withdrawal of western troops, but would also lead to ”massive civil strife”. The opposite approach is the one advocated by Pakistan, which  – in somewhat unfortunately chosen words - is to “give peace a chance”.  Articulated in detail in a report produced jointly by the Jinnah Institute and the United States Institute of Peace, it aims for a negotiated settlement giving Afghan Pashtun a bigger say in the political process and possibly including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network. According to this version, the U.S. position of fight, talk and build cannot work because the insurgents will not trust the Americans to negotiate sincerely as long as they reserve the right to use their very considerable force.  Only a ceasefire on all sides would pave the way for meaningful talks on a political settlement. The report, criticised to some extent within Pakistan, also notes what is perhaps one of the trickiest issues in the whole approach to Taliban talks: this is not just about Afghanistan. Whatever Pakistan really wants to happen in Afghanistan, and whatever it support it does or does not give to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, it is also dependent on them to keep control of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). According to this excerpt, those who contributed to the Jinnah Institute report questioned “the mis-perception that the Pakistani security establishment is unaware of the growing linkages between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani militant groups.” “ However, they argue that while the current links remain limited, it is precisely the fear of these growing into full blown operational cooperation and coordination that prevents the Pakistani state from targeting Afghan insurgent groups on its soil. Moreover, the security establishment is able to take advantage of the present linkages between these groups from time to time by persuading the Afghan Taliban to pressure the TTP and other North Waziristan-based militants to curtail their activities.” Stretch that argument out further and you could make a case that Pakistan needs to get a reasonable deal for the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqanis in Afghanistan if it wants them, in return, to bring the Pakistani Taliban to heel. So to get back to Clinton and the Afghan settlement. We have three possible approaches, with various permutations.  The one currently favoured by the United States is to keep fighting, to keep the door open for talks, and to keep piling pressure on Pakistan in the hope that it yields results. The second – as expressed by Amrullah Saleh – is to take the idea of talks with insurgent leaders off the table altogether, end the confusion and build up governance within Afghanistan in the years that are left before 2014. The third is to seek a ceasefire, so that in the absence of violence, talks might take place in a more conducive atmosphere. Any one of those approaches has its merits.  But as long as all these conflicting ideas remain out there, we will see a lot of different groups lining up to argue with the Cheshire Cat.

Seattle startup raises $1.3 million to encrypt the cloud


Kory Gill’s “a-ha” moment came in the form of a lightning bolt that struck his Seattle home and fried his computers. In the aftermath, his wife’s main concern was whether their digitally stored family photos had survived the blast. “What more of a sign do you need to go start this company?” Gill recalled his wife asking him, who used the scare to leave a 20-year career at Microsoft (MSFT.O) and launch his own online backup company. Three years later (Reuters first interviewed Gill in 2009), Gill and co-founder Marius Nita – a former Microsoft colleague – are seeing some traction with Newline Software Inc, having launched the first version of their online storage product, Exact, into the market in August. Gill told Reuters they have just closed their latest financing round – Newline’s third – to bring their total funding to $1.3 million. The money, raised from friends and family, will be spent on improving the product, growing the brand and building a new software platform that will allow Newline to encrypt every piece of data stored online, or in “the cloud,” said Gill. The platform called OPTIC (Online Privacy Technology In the Cloud) is an application programming interface (API) that Gill hopes will give Newline a competitive advantage over much larger rivals such as Carbonite and Mozy. “There are a lot of online backup products out there so we needed a way to differentiate ourselves,” said Gill, referring to OPTIC as an “index to encrypt data in the cloud.” Newline is really two different companies: an online data storage service (Exact) where users store files and a software program (OPTIC) that is able to protect and archive sensitive data stored anywhere on the Web. OPTIC can be used on any platform, meaning Mozy or Carbonite customers can use it to encrypt their files, said Gill. He also noted that because Newline encrypts every piece of data, customers are able to retrieve files exactly the way they originally saved them, something the competition doesn’t currently offer. “The impact of that is (if) you backup all your pictures and news stories over the last year and you get a new computer and restore all those files to your computer they all have today’s date on them,” said Gill, who confessed that most of these advantages could be adapted by competitors within “three months.” Newline also faces a tough challenge competing for users against Carbonite (CARB.OQ), a publicly traded company that has raised more than $60 million in venture capital, that spends far more on customer acquisition costs. Gill, who won’t disclose the company’s number of users, said Newline aims to grow at roughly a tenth of the rate as Carbonite, which has more than a million subscribers. Newline will target “smaller incremental more steady growth,” said Gill, adding they will look to attack the crowded space in different ways. “We’re looking for the blue oceans,” said Gill, whose company eschews flat monthly fees, preferring to charge customers for what they actually use. “We have some markets and niches that are not being noticed by the current players in the space and that’s where we’re making our largest inroads in some of the spaces that are being overlooked.” He added that Newline also promises “100 percent data privacy,” which means none of its staff can see the files they store. Gill said this service is unique to Newline and  something that will be especially attractive to businesses that have highly sensitive legal and financial information. Gill is trying to transition Newline more towards the data privacy spectrum, where its software has “applications far beyond what we’re doing.” He said cloud computing is still in its infancy and companies like Newline are just starting to discover how people store their personal data and share it between devices such as personal computers and smartphones. “Like any product that has just launched part of our struggle and job is to make a name for yourself and be seen as a reputable service,” said Gill, adding Newline will be looking to attract some venture capital going forward “to really make a dent here.” See related Reuters video:

UPDATE 5-Apple must show patents valid in Samsung case-US judge


* Samsung tablets infringe Apple patents-judge* Apple has a problem establishing patent validity-judge* Apple must show both patent infringement and validityBy Dan LevineSAN JOSE, Calif., Oct 13 (Reuters) - A U.S. judge said that Samsung Electronic’s Galaxy tablets infringe Apple Inc’s iPad patents, but added that Apple has a problem establishing the validity of its patents in the latest courtroom face-off between the technology giants.U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh made the comments in a court hearing on Thursday, but has yet to rule on Apple’s request to bar some Galaxy products from being sold in the United States.Apple and Samsung are engaged in a bruising legal battle that includes more than 20 cases in 10 countries as the two jostle for the top spot in the smartphone and tablet markets.Earlier on Thursday, an Australian court slapped a temporary ban on the sale of Samsung’s latest computer tablet in that country.Apple sued Samsung in the United States in April, saying the South Korean company’s Galaxy line of mobile phones and tablets “slavishly” copies the iPhone and iPad.Apple then filed a request in July to bar some Samsung products from U.S. sale, including the Galaxy S 4G smartphone and the Galaxy Tab 10.1 tablet.Mobile providers Verizon Wireless and T-Mobile USA have opposed Apple’s request, arguing that a ban on Galaxy products would cut into holiday sales.Apple must show both that Samsung infringed its patents and that its patents are valid under the law.Samsung attorney Kathleen Sullivan argued that in order to defeat an injunction bid, Samsung need only show that it has raised strong enough questions about the validity of Apple’s patents.”We think we’ve clearly raised substantial questions,” Sullivan said at the hearing on Thursday in a San Jose, California federal court.Apple attorney Harold McElhinny said Apple’s product design is far superior to previous tablets, so Apple’s patents should not be invalidated by designs that came before.”It was the design that made the difference,” McElhinny said.Koh frequently remarked on the similarity between each company’s tablets. At one point during the hearing, she held one black glass tablet in each hand above her head, and asked Sullivan if she could identify which company produced which.”Not at this distance your honor,” said Sullivan, who stood at a podium roughly ten feet away.”Can any of Samsung’s lawyers tell me which one is Samsung and which one is Apple?” Koh asked. A moment later, one of the lawyers supplied the right answer.Additionally, at the hearing Koh said she would deny Apple’s request for an injunction based on one of Apple’s so-called “utility” patents.She did not say whether she would grant the injunction based on three other Apple “design” patents.Koh characterized her thoughts on the utility patent as “tentative” but said she would issue a formal order “fairly promptly.”“It took a long time to make that distinction,” Koh said.After the hearing, Samsung spokesman Kim Titus said Apple’s injunction request is “groundless.”Apple spokeswoman Kristen Huguet said, “It’s no coincidence that Samsung’s latest products look a lot like the iPhone and iPad … This kind of blatant copying is wrong, and we need to protect Apple’s intellectual property when companies steal our ideas.”The case in U.S. District Court, Northern District of California is Apple Inc v. Samsung Electronics Co Ltd et al, 11-1846.

Standard Life sues insurers over pension fund loss


“Standard Life is pursuing a claim through the Commercial Court in London against its professional indemnity insurers,” a spokesman said.”This relates to the decision by Standard Life to make a payment of circa 100 million pounds into the pension sterling fund in February 2009, something the insurers have refused to indemnify.”Standard Life agreed to replenish the fund after some customers complained they had been given the impression it was invested in cash, whereas it was in fact also exposed to asset-backed securities, which fell heavily in value after the failure of Lehman Brothers.The court hearing began on Tuesday, and is expected to last about four weeks.ACE declined to comment, as did Catlin Insurance and AIG-owned Chartis Insurance UK , two of the other insurers involved.

Weight-loss surgery lowers heart risks


Based on three studies, the 10-year risk of suffering a heart attack dropped from more than six percent before the procedure — also known as bariatric surgery — to less than four afterwards.”The bariatric community has recognized the remarkable metabolic benefits of weight loss surgery for several years, so we were not too surprised by the findings reported in this study,” said lead researcher Dr. Helen M. Heneghan in an email to Reuters Health.”However, these findings may surprise cardiologists and physicians who treat obese patients for weight-related illnesses on a daily basis, yet are less familiar with the dramatic metabolic effects of bariatric surgery.”Heneghan, from Ohio’s Cleveland Clinic, and colleagues reviewed 52 studies involving 16,867 patients who had weight loss surgery.After the procedures, patients shed about half their excess weight on average, according to the new report, which appears in the American Journal of Cardiology.In 68 percent of the cases, patients saw their high blood pressure either disappear or dip, and diabetes improved in three-quarters of them as early as three months after the surgery, lasting at least up to 13 years of follow-up.In the only study that reported on deaths from heart attacks, surgery appeared to cut the rate by half — from 1.2 percent to 0.65 percent.”We hope that after reading this (review), physicians will recognize that their obese patients with cardiovascular risk factors or established cardiovascular disease would benefit immensely from weight loss surgery,” Heneghan said.Two of the five authors of this study reported financial associations with companies that manufacture equipment used in bariatric surgery.

FACTBOX-Dexia’s assets, business units


* Dexia’s large bond portfolio and toxic assets are likely to be shifted to a “bad bank” guaranteed by French and Belgian governments:The bond portfolio grew to 95.3 billion euros ($129 billion) at the end of June 2011, including:- 24.5 billion in local public sector bonds- 15.8 billion in sovereign debt- 15.6 billion in bank bonds- 12 billion of covered bonds- 7.1 billion of asset-backed securities- 7.4 billion of mortgage-backed securities* Dexia Municipal Agency (DexMa): bond issuance vehicle at the heart of Dexia Credit Local, the French unit of Dexia.- Portfolio consists of some 80 billion euros and essentially comprises loans to local governments, mostly but not exclusively French. Experts say about 10 billion euros of these loans may never be repaid and are being disputed by French towns in lawsuits.- A new holding company jointly owned by French government banks Caisse des Depots and Banque Postale is expected to take over this unit, although the exact amounts each will control has yet to be determined.* Dexia Bank Belgium- Belgium is expected to nationalise the largely retail Belgian banking unit of Dexia, although a report in Belgian daily L’Echo mentioned Santander , BBVA , HSBC , Deutsche Bank , RabobankSociété Générale as possible buyers.* Dexia Banque Internationale in Luxembourg (BIL)- Luxembourg’s government said on Thursday it was in talks with a potential investor in Dexia’s unit there. Luxembourg Finance Minister Luc Frieden has said the talks were at an advanced stage and could be finalised before the end of October.- Media have reported it is set to be sold to Qatar for 900 million euros.* Other units- Denizbank : Dexia’s Turkish unit, could be the object of a bid by Russia’s Sberbank , according to French daily Les Echos.- Crediop, Sabadell: the Italian and Spanish public finance units of Dexia, which specialize in municipal finance, may end up as part of the “bad bank.”- RBC Dexia Investor Services: the funds custody joint venture with Royal Bank of Canada , which had $2.8 trillion in client assets under management at the end of last year, could also be a candidate for sale.- Dexia’s asset management unit had 86.4 billion euros under administration as of the end of 2010 and is also likely to go on the block.